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Abstracts 
This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanism on external auditors selection at 
manufacturing companies listed on the Stock Exchange in 2014-2016. The purpose of this study is to examine 
the effect of majority shareholders on external auditors selection. The size of the board of commissioners against 
external auditors selection. Audit committee size against the selection of external auditors. Level of leverage to 
external auditors selection. The population in this study is manufacturing companies listed on Indonesian Stock 
Exchange in 2014-2016. Data analysis Methods using statistical analysis of Multiple Regression with Eviews. 
This study results show that majority shareholder has significant effect, the size of board of commissioner has 
significant effect, audit committee has no effect and leverage have significant effect. 
Keywords: majority shareholder, board size, audit committee, and leverage to external auditors selection 
 
I. Introduction 
The company conducts auditor selection in order to obtain a high quality audit, because the selection of 
auditors is a selection process undertaken by the company to choose a public accounting firm as a provider 
of audit services among the many public accounting firms that exist with variations of audit quality. 
Companies need considerations in conducting the selection of qualified auditors such as consideration of 
knowledge, skills, independence and adequate competence. This leads to the selection of auditors an 
important decision and should be considered carefully by the company. The financial sector has a very 
important role to the growth of the country's economy, so it is important for companies to have a good 
corporate governance mechanism. The role of external auditors in corporate governance mechanisms is very 
important as a supervisor in the process of corporate financial statements (Ashbaugh, et al, 2013). 
Lin and Liu's (2010) study results on corporate governance mechanisms on the selection of external auditors, suggest 
that firms with majority shareholders or CEOs and chairmen of commissioners with the same person would be less 
likely to hire 4 top auditors in China. So the weakness of the company in choosing a quality auditor because of lack of 
benefits corporate governance mechanisms in the company. 
Cheng (2010) study results on auditor selection that effect management in corporate governance both externally 
and internally related to earnings management (Chinese state study), states that the result that high quality 
auditors provide a more significant corporate governance mechanism because of the influence demographics 
and characteristics in corporate governance management so as to effect auditors selection. With CEOs with 
academic and professional certifications, CEOs tend to choose high-quality auditors for their companies.  
Markali (2012) study results on the relationship of corporate governance mechanism with the selection of 
auditors in financial sector business entities go public. states that if good corporate internal governance 
mechanisms will lead to a tendency for companies to choose high quality auditors. The purpose of this study is 
to prove empirically about: 
1. The effect of majority shareholder on external auditors selection 
2. The effect of size of the board of commissioners on external auditors selection 
3. The effect of audit committee on external auditors selection 
4. The Effect of task leverage on external auditors selection 
The objectives of this study are to supplement knowledge and insights, especially those related to majority 
shareholder, the size of the board of commissioners, audit committee and leverage. 
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The importance of this study review provides better and more precise information on the quality of the audit 
results for decision making. Auditors selection is the determination of who the auditor deems relevant to provide 
an assessment of the company's overall financial and operating conditions 
 
II. Literature Review 
1. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is a concept based on agency theory, is expected to serve as a tool to provide assurance to 
investors that they would receive a return on the funds they have invested (Herawaty, 2009). While Corporate 
Governance is a proposed concept for improving company performance through supervision and monitoring of 
management performance and ensuring management accountability to stakeholders based on regulatory 
framework (Nasustion, 2010). According to the Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI, 2004) 
corporate governance is a set of rules that establishes relationships between shareholders, managers of 
companies, creditors, governments, employees and other internal and external stakeholders related to their rights 
and obligations, or in other words a system that regulates and controls the company. Corporate Governance 
includes a set of relationships between a company's management, the board of management, shareholders and 
others with an interest in the company (Putra et al, 2014). Corporate governance is one of the key elements to 
improve economic efficiency, which includes a range of relationships between company management, board of 
commissioners, shareholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides a structure that 
facilitates the determination of the goals of a company, and as a means to determine the performance monitoring 
techniques (Ujiyanto, 2010). 
 
2. Majority Shareholder 
The ownership structure has a significant influence on CG mechanisms and company performance (Schleifer 
and Vishny, 2010). Claessens and Fan (2012) reveal that the characteristics of the ownership structure 
determine the agency issues that occur. In companies in countries such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom that have a diffused ownership structure, agency problems occur between outside investors and 
agents, where agents act as pure professionals and relatively have no significant ownership in the company. 
While in Asia, where most of the big companies have a concentrated ownership structure, the agency 
problem shifts from issues between shareholders and agents to conflicts between controlling shareholders 
and minority owners. The company's largest shareholding is chosen because it is considered influential in 
policy making within the company including the external auditor selection policy. In some previous studies it 
has been suggested that high concentrations of stock ownership will be the solution of the agency conflict 
between majority shareholders or controllers with minority shareholders (Gomes, 2010). That is because the 
majority shareholder is considered to have the competence and credibility to advance the company and will 
not violate the rights of minority shareholders. 
 
3. Size of the Board of Commissioners 
Wardhani (2011) states that the board of directors in a company will determine the policy to be taken or the 
company's strategy in the short term and long term and the role of board of commissioners in a company is 
more emphasized on the monitoring function of the policy directors. Chen (2012) revealed that there is a 
positive influence between the size of the board of commissioners and the level of corporate governance 
because the more the number of members of the board of commissioners the supervisory function will be more 
stringent or more effective. The fewer members of the board of commissioners will reflect weaker Corporate 
Governance mechanisms that will allow for greater profit-making by the controlling shareholders and the 
possibility of choosing a quality auditor will be even smaller as the shareholder wants to retain the benefits. 
Forker (2010) in Ho and Wong (2011) and Nofsinger and Mohr (2010) stated that a growing number of 
members of the board of commissioners increased oversight of the quality of financial statement disclosure and 
reduced the profitability of the hidden information. According to Company Law No. 40 of 2007, the board of 
commissioners is the organ of the company responsible for general supervision. 
 
4. Audit Committee 
The main task of the audit committee in principle is to assist the board of commissioners in performing the 
oversight function of a company's performance. The supervisory function performed by the audit committee is 
primarily concerned with an internal control system of the firm, then provides adequate assurance on the quality 
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of the financial statements and improves the effectiveness of the audit function which is then verified by the 
external auditor. So the audit committee can be said to function as a bridge between corporate liaison with 
external auditors (Balafif, 2010). According to IDX and Capital Market and Financial Report Supervisory 
regulations, every public company listed on the IDX is required to have an independent audit committee with a 
minimum membership of three, consisting of one independent commissioner as chairman and at least two 
independent external parties as members. Related to one of the audit committee functions in terms of 
supervising the preparation of the company's financial statements, if the role of the audit committee is truly 
effective, the company should present a high quality audit report. 
 
5. Leverage 
A company that has high financial leverage berartil has a lot of hutalng on outside pihlak. With a high leverage 
ratio then the company will have difficulty in paying the loan and interest. To overcome this, before the 
creditor gives the loan, the creditor asks for an independent party, namely the public accountant to check the 
company's financial statements, whether the comparative value of debt and assets has met certain percentages 
so as to ensure the certainty that the company can pay off the debts that have matured. Abdel-Khalik (2012) 
states that the owner requested an external audit in order to comply with the limits granted to the organization 
by the creditor. Chow (2009) states that the higher the ratio of debt in a firm's capital structure, the higher the 
likelihood of a company using the services of a public accounting firm. This is based on the assumption that when 
the composition of debt in the capital structure increases, the owners tend to transfer the wealth from the creditors, 
therefore the creditors have a greater desire to use the services of a qualified public accounting firm (KAP). The 
results of research conducted by Chow (2010), Nasir (2010), Susilowati (2011) and Sumanto (2011) found that 
leverage affects the demand for external audit services. While Kono (2011) found that leverage does not affect the 
demand for external audit services.  
 
 
6. Research Framework and Previous Studies 
The framework of this research is to describe the effect between independent variables and the dependent 
variable as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 
Research Framework 
 
7. Hypothesis Development 
1).  The Effect of Majority Shareholder on External Auditors Selection 
Managerial ownership is an investment to the company by the management of the company, the board of 
directors of the company, or the party authorized to run the company's operations. Imanta and Satwiko 
(2011) stated that with managerial ownership, managers as operators of the company as well as 
shareholders, will be encouraged to act in accordance with shareholder wishes by improving performance 
and responsibility in achieving prosperity for shareholders. This shows the greater the percentage of 
ownership of shares owned the more likely to choose a qualified external auditors. This result is not 
support Lin and Liu's research (2009) in his study found that firms with the highest percentage of 
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ownership of higher shares will have a lower probability of choosing a qualified auditor because the 
controlling shareholder wants to retain the advantage they can get through financial reporting not 
transparent. 
Based on the description, the hypothesis of this study as follows: 
H1: Majority Shareholder has a effect on External Auditors Selection 
 
2).  The Effect of Board of Commissioner's Size on External Auditors Selection 
Indonesia adopted a dual board system, consisting of boards of directors and board of commissioners. Wardhani 
(2010) states that the board of directors in a company will determine the policy to be taken or the company's 
strategy in the short term and long term and the role of board of commissioners in a company more emphasis on 
the monitoring function of the policy directors. Based on the agency perspective, the monitoring function is 
crucial in minimizing agent opportunistic actions and reducing agency costs, indicating that there is a positive 
board of commissioner's size towards the of External Auditor selection. According to Company Law No. 40 of 
2007, the board of commissioners is a part of the company that has the duty to conduct general and / or special 
supervision in accordance with the articles of association and give advice to the directors. Through a study in 
China, Chen (2011) in the Obe Efrem Markali study, and Felizia Arni Rudiawarni (2012) stated that 
there is a positive effect between the size of the board of commissioners and the level of corporate 
governance because the more the number of members of the board of commissioners the supervision 
function will be more effective. The fewer members of the board of commissioners will reflect the 
weaker CG mechanism so that it will allow for greater profit making by the controlling shareholder and 
the possibility of choosing a quality auditor will be even smaller as the shareholder wants to keep his 
profits. The addition of members to the board of commissioners can also be interpreted as the addition 
of expertise within the council. Members of the board of commissioners who have expertise in a 
particular field are able to provide valuable advice in the preparation of strategy and organization of the 
company (Fama & Jensen, 2010). In relation to the supervisory and advisory function, a larger board of 
commissioners will be able to perform its functions better. 
Based on the description, the hypothesis of this study as follows: 
H2: Board of Commissioner's Size has a Effect on External Auditors Selection 
 
3).  The Effect of Audit Committee on External Auditors Selection 
The role of the audit committee is effected by several characteristics that have been demonstrated in 
previous studies, namely the independence, activity, size, and competence of the audit committee. The 
influence of these characteristics is seen as one unity and measured in scores. IDX and Market Place and 
Financial Statement Supervisory regulations require the independence characteristics of the audit 
committee. Therefore, the effectiveness differences of the audit committee are assumed to be influenced 
only by the characteristics of activity, size, and competence. If the company has sufficient members of 
the audit committee, the audit committee should oversee the financial reporting process more 
effectively, then can provide information to the company in selecting a good quality external auditor. 
The development of regulations that explain the audit committee and its functions in more detail will have 
an impact on the audit process in the corporate environment whether it is internal or external audit. In 
accordance with the function and purpose of the establishment of the audit committee, the process of 
supervising the financial statements, auditor selection and audit fees will depend on the quality of the audit 
committee owned by the company and will affect the quality of the External Auditor used (Rainsbury et al. 
2009) in Dedi Putra (2014 ). However, not all related to the financial statements can be monitored by the 
audit committee in which in the process of making financial statements, the management has the greatest 
rights and responsibilities in intervening against corporate accountants and in determining the External 
Auditor. This study shows that the Audit Committee did not affect the External Auditor selection (Iatridis 
2011). 
Based on the description, the hypothesis of this study as follows: 
H3: Audit Committee has a Effect on External Auditors Selection  
 
4).  The Effect of Leverage on External Auditors Selection 
Mansi et al. (2009) and Kim and Song (2011) stated that in order to increase the credibility and reliability 
of accounting information, a high-quality auditor can assist the debtor to signal the quality of the credit 
and minimize the risk of financial information. Broye and Weill (2011) in the research of Antonius 
Singgih Setiawan, Yusef Widia Karsana, Ichsan Setiyo Budi, and Drajat Armon (2015) concluded that 
companies are more protecting the creditor's rights by choosing a large auditor for their company. This 
relates to providing reliable financial information, so by choosing a qualified auditor, the company strives 
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to provide information quality assurance through the use of high quality auditors. This is supported by the 
findings of Almutairi (2013) which found a positive correlation between leverage and the quality of 
auditors in the context of specialist auditors. 
Based on the description, the hypothesis of this study as follows: 
H4: Leverage has a Effect on External Auditors Selection 
 
III. Research Method 
This research uses a method of causal research with associative hypothesis that aims to test about effect of one or 
more variables on the variable causality, between a variable (Indenpenden / Xn) with other variables (Dependent 
Variable / Yn). In this case it consists of: X1 = majority shareholder, X2 = board of commissioner size, X3 = 
audit committee, X4 = leverage, and Y = external auditor selection. This research requires hypothesis testing 
with statistical test. 
1. Definition and Operationalization of Variables 
Variables are everything that will be the object of observation in the research in the form of a concept that has 
variations in value. In this research will be revealed independent variable (independent variable) and dependent 
variable (dependent variable, independent variables are: 
a) Majority Shareholder (X1) as a Independent variable 
b) Board of commissioner size (X2) as a Independent variable 
c) Audit Committee (X3) as a Independent variable 
d) Leverage (X4) as a Independent variable 
e) External Auditor Selection (Y) as a Dependent variable 
 
Operational definition of a variable is a definition given to a variable by giving meaning, or providing an 
operational needed to measure that variable. The Operational Definition Variables used by the author in 
conducting the preparation of research are: 
1. External Auditor Selection 
Dependent variable in this study is the Selection of Public Accounting Firm is a public accountant office 
services appointed by the company to audit financial statements. This research uses logit model because the 
dependent variable used is binary or dummy variable. These variables distinguish between high quality 
external auditors and lower quality external auditors. The sample will be worth 1 if the company chooses 
the Big Four public accounting firm, while the sample will be 0 if the company chooses a public accounting 
firm other than the Big Four. 
2. Majority Shareholder 
Majority Shareholder variable is measured from the percentage of share ownership of Majority Shareholder 
indicating the percentage of share ownership of Majority Shareholder compared to the number of shares 
outstanding. 
3. Board of Commissioner 
Board of commissioners size is measured by number of board of commissioners owned by the company. 
4. Audit Committee 
The number of audit committee members can affect the effectiveness of the audit committee's functioning. 
Under the terms of the IDX and Market Place and Financial Statement Superviory, the total number of 
audit committee members of a company shall be 3 (three) persons. The criteria of assessment used are 
Good if the number of audit committee members is more than 3 (three) persons, Fair if the total of audit 
committee members is 3 (three) persons, Poor if the total number of audit committee members is less than 
3 (three) persons. Indicators that get good score will be given score 3, fair given score 2, and poor score 1. 
5. Leverage 
Leverage is defined as a financial leverage that measures how much a company uses debt to finance its 
assets. Leverage is measured using the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Bolak et al., 2013). 
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Table 5.1 
Measurement Scale 
VARIABLES 
WHICH 
MEASURED 
INDICATOR DESIGN 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE (Y) 
External Auditor 
Selection 
distinguish between external auditors 
including the Big Four and not the Big 
Four (Dummy). 
1 : Auditor Big Four 
0 : Auditor Non Big Four 
Causal Research 
Model 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (X) 
Majority 
Shareholder 
percentage share ownership of 
majority shareholder when 
compared with the number of 
shares outstanding 
Causal Research 
Model 
Board of Commissioner 
Size 
the number of board of commissioners 
owned by the company 
Causal Research 
Model 
Audit Committee the number of audit committee members of 
a company 
Causal Research 
Model 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets Causal Research 
Model 
 
2. Data Analysis Method 
Data analysis methods using Multiple Regression statistical analysis with Eviews. 
1. Descriptive Statistic 
Descriptive analysis method based on financial statements that have been collected and then analyzed. This 
analysis is used to provide descriptive of the research variables: External auditor quality, corporate governance 
covering majority shareholder, board size, audit committee size, and leverage that can be seen from the standard 
deviation, mean (average), the amount of data, and median. 
2. Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis has a method of simple regression analysis. If the parameters of a functional 
relationship between one dependent variable with other independent variables are more than one variable, 
where regression analysis will be done with respect to multiple regression. The formulas to be used are none 
other than the development of the formulas used in simple regression. (Moh Nazir, 2011). To determine the best 
model will be determined by determining the model. Model to be used is Panel Data Model. The use of both 
tests in the selection of the best model of panel data regression is shown by the following figure: 
a.         Chow Test 
Chow test is a test to compare common effect model with fixed effect (Widarjono, 2009). Chow 
test in this study using Eviews program. The hypotheses to be formed in the Chow test are as 
follows: 
H0 = Common Effect Model 
H1 = Fixed Effect Model 
Ho is not accepted if P-value is smaller than a value. Otherwise, Ho is accepted if the P-value is 
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greater than a value. A value that is used is 5%. 
b.        Test Hausman 
This test compares the fixed effect model with random effect in determining the best model to be 
used as a panel data regression model (Gujarati, 2012). Hausman test using a similar program with 
Chow test is as follows: 
H0 = Random Effect Model 
H1 = Fixed Effect Model 
Ho is not accepted if P-value is smaller than a value. Otherwise, Ho is accepted if the P-value is 
greater than a value. A value that is used is 5%. 
3. Hypothesis 
Hypothesis test that will be used in research using Multiple Regression analysis because independent variable 
more than one. Parameters of a functional relationship between the dependent variable (External Auditor 
Selection) with more than one Independent variable (Moh. Nazir, 2011). The relationship of two dependent 
variables with independent variables as follows: 
 
AUD   = α+ β1 MOWN + β2 SB + β3 AUDCOM + β4 LEV + € 
 
Note: 
AUD            = External Auditor Selection (Big Four/Non Big Four) 
α                  = Constants Value 
β1,2,3,4       = Variable Coefficient 
MOWN       = Majority Shareholder 
SB               = the number of Board of Commissioner (supervisory board) 
AUDCOM  = the number of committee audit 
LEV             = Leverage 
€                   = Error 
IV. Research Results and Discussion 
1. Hypothesis Test  
a. Determination Coefficient 
Determination coefficient of measures the extent of the model's ability to explain the variation of the dependent 
variable. Determination coefficient value is between 0 and 1. So the value of adjusted R2 approaching 1 then the 
better the ability of the model in explaining the dependent variable. The calculation determination coefficient 
results as follows: 
Table 6.9 
Hasil Uji Koefisien Determinasi 
 
 
Table 6.9 shows that the panel data regression equation has an Adjusted R-Squared value is 0.8317 which means 
83.17% of dependent variable variation is the external auditor selection can be explained by majority 
shareholder, Board of Commissioners size, the size of the audit committee, and Leverage . While the remaining 
16.83% is explained by other variables outside the research model. 
b. Simultaneous Significance Test (F Test) 
F test is performed to find out whether the independent variables as a whole or jointly are statistically 
significant in influencing the dependent variable. If F arithmetic value greater than F table value then the 
independent variables as a whole or jointly affect the dependent variable. Hypothesis used (Gujarati, 2003): 
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Table 6.10 
F Test Results 
 
 
Probability F-statistic value of 0.0000 and less than 0.05 indicates that simultaneously independent variables 
used in the model significantly effect the dependent variable, that is external auditors selection. 
c.  Partial Significant Test (T-test) 
T-test aims to determine the magnitude of effect of each independent variable individually on the dependent. 
Hypothesis used. T test results as follows: 
Table 6.11 
T Test Results 
 
 
The regression equation is as follows: 
 
AUD          =  4,481492  –  11,52974MOWN*  +  5,390523SB*  - 0,092358AUDCOM*  +  5,359172LEV* 
*) significant in 5 % alpha 
 
From the above regression equation can be interpreted: 
1) The MOWN variable has a t value is -11.52974 and the sig value. or p-value is 0.0000 or less than alpha 
0.05, this indicates that the MOWN variable significantly effect on the external auditors selection. 
2) The SB variable has a t value is 5.390523 and the sig value. or p-value is 0.0000 or less than alpha 0.05, it 
shows that the SB variable has a significant effect on the external auditor's selection. 
3) The AUDCOM variable has a t value of -0.092358 and the sig value. or p-value is 0.9266 or greater than 
alpha 0.05, this indicates that the AUDCOM variable has no effect on the external auditor selection. 
4) The LEV variable has a t value of 5.359172 and the sig value. is 0,0000 or less than alpha 0,05, it shows that 
LEV variable has significant effect on external auditor election. 
In this study, majority shareholder (MOWN) has a significant effect on external auditors selection. Coefficient 
value is -1.542402 indicates that the effect of MOWN on external auditors selection is negative, when MOWN 
increase by one, then external auditors selection will decrease by 1.542402. In this case it can be said that 
majority shareholder will affect on external auditors selection. Obe Efrem Markali, and Felizia Arni 
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Rudiawarni stated that MOWN has a positive effect on external auditors selection at the company. The level is 
significant 0.012 and not significant at 5%. In Desti Maharani study (2012), majority shareholder significantly 
effected external auditors selection with a significant level is 0.00035 under 0.05. The results show that the 
existence of majority shareholder affects the selection of qualified external auditors at the company. 
Based on statistical tests results, SB (the Board of Commissioners size) has a significant effect on the external 
auditors selection. Coefficient value is 0.109037 indicates that the effect of SB on the external auditors selection is 
positive, when the SB increase by one, then the external auditors selection will increase by 0.109037. In Desti 
Maharani study (2012) Board of Commissioners Size with significant 0,00335 and significant at 1%.  This 
indicates that the variable of the board of commissioners size has a positive effect on the external auditors 
selection. In Dedi Putra's research (2014) the board of commissioners size has a positive and significant effect 
on external auditors selection with significant 0.0005 below 0.05. 
Audit committee size in research on external auditors selection. Coefficient value is -0.004232 with significant 
value of 0.9266 above 0.05 indicates that there is no effect of AUDCOM on external auditors selection. In Desti 
Maharani’s study (2012) the effect of audit committee size on  external auditors selection significant level of 
0.09470 and significant at 10%. This indicates that audit committee size has a positive effect on external auditors 
selection. In research Dedi Putra (2014) audit committee size effect on external auditors selection with 
significant 0.0529 below 0.10. 
Leverage level in statistical testing has a t value is 5.3592 and the value of sig. equal to 0,0000 or less than alpha 
0,05, it shows that Leverage variable has significant effect to external auditor election. Coefficient value is 
0.412444 indicates that the influence of leverage on the selection of external auditors is positive. In Antonius 
Singgih Setiawan, Yusef Widia Karsana, Ichsan Setiyo Budi, and Drajat Armon (2015), leverage shows a 
significant level is 0.890 greater than the 5% alpha. This indicates that leverage does not affect the external 
auditors selection. 
In Cok Istri Ratna Sari Dewi, and Ni Made Dwi Ratnadi study(2014) leverage with significant 0,0185 and 
significant at 5%. This indicates that the leverage variable has a positive effect on the external auditors selection. 
 
V. Conclusion and Suggestion 
1. Conclusion 
Based on analysis results and research discussion, it can be concluded as follows: 
1. Implementation of Professional Ethics has a significant effect on Decision Making for 
Auditors at Public Accounting Office of DKI Jakarta. The results of this study provide 
empirical evidence that Decision Making For Auditors effected by variables Implementation 
of Professional Ethics. 
2. Emotional Intelligence has a positive and significant effect on Decision Making for Auditor 
at Public Accounting Office of DKI Jakarta. The higher one has Emotional Intelligence the 
higher the Decision Making For the Auditor is formed. The results of this study provide 
empirical evidence that Decision Making for Auditors is effected by emotional intelligence 
variables. 
2. Suggestion 
Based on analysis results, discussion and conclusions that have been described previously, the authors provide 
suggestions that can be used as input or consideration for the parties concerned as follows: 
1. This research is expected to be useful for students, academics, Audiotor as well as other 
researchers as well as shaping the character of an ethical Auditor even though the opportunities 
that exist out there offer and lead to utilization to perform unethical actions in decision making 
on the auditor's opinion of the financial statements.  
2. By this Research the parties concerned can determine the steps that need to be applied in 
overseeing and assessing the implementation of good professional ethics, and as a reference to 
establish rules and policies on decision-making for auditors. The findings in this study can be 
used as a motivation for auditors in Public Accounting Firm (KAP), which is accommodated by 
the Indonesian Institute of Public Accountants (IAPI) and the community so as to increase 
awareness of the Auditor with training related to the development of emotional intelligence on 
decision making for the auditor. 
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